| A War in the Summer? |
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| Ha’aretz |
| Sunday, April 22,
2007 |
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The talk
about a sizable war this summer already started in the
midst of the war last summer (there were those who
called it a promo and thanked Hezbollah for having
revealed its weaknesses in ample time). A "sizable war"
is a code name for a war that includes Syria. The
outgoing chief of staff estimated in November that there
would be a war with Syria this summer, and in a series
of general-staff discussions he held, there was talk of
"a working assessment" that dictated exercises in
anticipation of a war this summer.
Now the summer is almost upon us. Was this an assessment
or a self-fulfilling prophecy? When the Syrian president
says that if there is no peace there will be a war, he
is responding to incessant mumbling from our side. This
is where the dynamics of another war start. In a
situation as explosive as that in the Middle East, the
sparks can be ignited even when no one really wants that
to happen.
Too many people sit in too many rooms with war maps
rather than maps with peace arrangements. There are new
plans with new code names. There are colorful computer
presentations, and in place of every division commander
who has lost face, there is another glowing radiantly
for the moment with an updated military doctrine that
will provide "the answer," as they say in the army, to
problems revealed in the previous war. Instead of a
chief of staff who relies only on the air force, we now
have a chief of staff from the Golani Brigade. It can be
assumed that he is fervently training regular and
reserve forces for the next round after reading all the
debriefings and learning the necessary lessons.
But the main lesson, after all, has yet to be learned.
To this day, the decision makers believe that last
summer's war was inevitable and was merely conducted
without talent. Just a few corrections, and we can go on
our way again. That is why, when the prime minister asks
the new chief of staff if the Israel Defense Forces can
beat the Syrians, he will apparently respond in the
affirmative. A chief of staff is a chief of staff, after
all. But at a meeting of military-academy graduates held
last week, Major General (res.) Uri Saguy said that this
result is dubious. There will no longer be a classic
defeat. Israel's security concept, which is based mostly
on deterrence, warning and defeat, is no longer
relevant. After a war with Syria, this summer or
another, the strategic reality will not change;
therefore, it is possible to skip the war and move
straight on to the agreements.
One can assume that in the next war, the IDF will
already know how to capture Hezbollah's "nature
reserves" and find those responsible for firing the
Katyushas. But in the next war, we will face a mass of
rockets and long-range missiles, some of which, perhaps,
with chemical warheads that the Syrians will fire, not
necessarily from Bint Jbeil. The home front will remain
the same home front. Perhaps it will be weaker, because
the civilians have also learned their lessons and know
the only thing the state has to offer is firemen with
hoses. Perhaps this time they will provide protection
for Safed's hospital. But that belongs to the last war.
Now the hospitals in Tel Aviv are on the front line.
Whoever speaks about the necessity of preparing the home
front for the next war is planting false hopes. It is
impossible to protect the home front, not in half a year
and perhaps not at all. The only really effective
protection for the home front is a political
arrangement. When Ehud Olmert goes to bed at night, does
he think about how to prevent the next war or how to
rehabilitate his lost pride ("the deterrence") and that
of the IDF? If he is afraid of being remembered as the
one responsible for a defective war, perhaps he indeed
is planning the "campaign for bringing back pride." But
if he internalized something else last summer, for
example, how a modern war looks when the home front is
exposed, perhaps he will think twice before agreeing to
bomb an air field of a neighboring country. Perhaps he
has understood that modern war equipment does not put
the home front at a greater distance, and that America's
strength also stems from the fact that its home front is
very far from any front.
Something very, very strange has been happening since
last summer. Several months have elapsed since the last
war, and it appears that it did not end, but rather just
stopped for a minute. We will merely read the Winograd
Committee's report and then continue. Meanwhile,
rumblings are being heard, from Pakistan to Syria and
Saudi Arabia, about the possibility of political
arrangements. But we are still talking about Gal Hirsch
and Udi Adam, and about who is more guilty for not
implementing the ground forces invasion plan.
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